š§š Inside Goldmanās $22B Bet on Venture Capital | Hans Swildens, Industry Ventures
How VC secondaries grew from a $250M to $150B market in 25 years, why asset managers are acquiring venture firms, how Seed survives the platform era, and lessons on manufacturing liquidity
Hans Swildens started Industry Ventures in 1999, and we recently sat down to record his first podcast since getting acquired by Goldman Sachs in 2026.
Hans has been buying venture secondaries longer than almost anyone, and the combined business is one of the largest VC portfolios in the world: 525 firms, 1,600 funds, and over $22B in capital commitments.
We get into why he sold to Goldman, starting Industry by acquiring funds at 99% discounts during the Dot Com Collapse, why most seed funds without a real angle have 5 years left, the LP base that's a completely different species every fund cycle, the day he passed on a multi-billion-dollar data center deal, how VCās are manufacturing their own exits, and why the secondary market may eventually be multiples the size of the primary market.
Thank you to Zach Coelius, Will Quist, Emily Zheng, and Andrea McGee for help brainstorming topics for the conversation.
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Timestamps to jump in:
0:00 Inside Goldmanās $22B venture bet
7:57 1,600 funds over 525 firms
11:11 Why scale lets you āsee the cubeā
14:17 Most humbling lesson in 26 years
16:19 Three types of Seed funds
18:47 LP's evolve every fund cycle
22:00 VC is a sales game
24:38 A strong CRM is non-negotiable
29:06 Buying secondaries during the Dot Com Collapse
31:33 Triangulating opinions across GPās, founders, and LPās
37:22 Seed without differentiation doesnāt work
42:16 Biggest mistakes by first-time GPās
44:31 Buying Enronās VC portfolio at a 99% discount
50:15 Entrepreneurial finance is underappreciated
52:15 Why asset managers are acquiring venture firms
58:47 Why itās hard to start venture programs
1:03:20 Secondaries: $250M to $150B market in 25 years
1:08:06 Continuation funds & debt structured secondaries
1:12:02 āSecondaries might be multiples bigger than primariesā
1:19:52 How to structure secondary transactions
1:26:00 What happens after SpaceX, OpenAI, Anthropic IPOās
1:30:35 How Seed survives the asset manager era
1:35:16 How to manufacture liquidity
1:41:41 How AI is impacting secondary markets
Referenced:
Find Hans on X / Twitter and LinkedIn
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Transcript
Find transcripts of all prior episodes here.
Turner Novak:
Hans, welcome to the show.
Hans Swildens:
Thanks, Turner. Thanks for having me.
Turner Novak:
So you started Industry Ventures over 20 years ago, I think 25 years ago, and you were recently acquired by Goldman Sachs. Can you just kinda talk about what happened with the acquisition?
Hans Swildens:
Sure. Yeah, weāve had a long relationship, a 20-year relationship, with Goldman, and it started as an LP and a co-investor back when the dot-com collapse happened and there was a lot of corporate venture funds and hedge funds and mutual funds that held venture securities that were trying to liquidate them. And so itās, itās been a really long-term relationship.
They started originally kind of as a competitor. They were funding one of our competitors, and then they started becoming a partner, and then they invested in our funds as a limited partner, and thatās kind of how the relationship started. I went to business school with the gentleman now that is the global CIO of alternatives and runs XIG.
His nameās Mike Brandmeier and he was in the class before me at Columbia. And so we had worked together when he was in the vintage funds, which is our secondary funds, and Harold, who runs the secondary funds, today, was there with Mike as well at that point. And so thatās how it started.
And then over the years, we started working on more things together. We co-developed a direct co-investment fund together after we launched and built a seed funding business of seeding venture funds and then co-investing with them and buying LPās in them. That business here we call our early stage team.
We have an early stage team, a secondary team, and then a co-investment team for buyout, tech buyout here. But then, the co-development of our co-investment funds with them was in 2016. And then, after that in 2019, they were keen on investing in our management company with their Petershill funds.
And so we actually took an investment, from, from the Petershill funds in XIG, the division that weāre now in, and Oli and Rob run those funds. And so they became a minority equity investor in our firm. I mean, we crea-created a firm balance sheet at that point.
That was seven years ago. So we kind of had a, weāve had a phased relationship with most of the different investment teams that are in our group, and weāve been working with all the partners, in the group as well as all the folks managing all the funds for a really long time. So it wasnāt something that...
It was a progression rather than something that, just showed up.
Turner Novak:
And why do it? Like, it seemed like things were going really well. Like, whatās the point of getting acquired by someone and joining a whole new firm?
Hans Swildens:
Yeah. I mean, everything here was a green light. So we didnāt have any yellow or red lights last year in terms of market growth, fund performance, team execution, portfolio construction, relationships and all that stuff.
But thatās... I found as an entrepreneur, ācause this is the third company Iāve had. I had two software companies with my brother before starting Industry Ventures, that when things are great is the best time to think about strategic options.
So we were thinking about it. We were continuing to get inbound interest from large publicly traded asset managers. Itās been happening now for six years.
And we had a, we had a competitor get acquired, by StepStone- And that theyāre, they were Green Spring, that was their name. And ever since then weāve been kind of on peopleās lists to, to try to target to see if they can, take our team and our funds and, and plug it into their multi-asset, alternatives firm. So we had, we had, we had, we had get an appro- we got approached again by another party that approached us five years ago.
So they reapproached us So we spent a good four months digging into everything. I would say they they knew us better than we knew them. And so a lot of, I would say it was two-thirds about us getting to know them better and kind of how we can take what weāve built and add it to their business, and then have it be a one plus one is three.
But after, I mean, every week we dug in, every week we came back saying, āWow, we didnāt realize that would be a huge benefit to us.ā And then by the end of the whole process, we both, decided that it would be a great fit. So we d- we went for it and negotiated a transaction.
Turner Novak:
And I know youāve told me before that this combined kind of Industry Ventures Goldman, Iām not sure. Actually, what is the name currently? Like, what do people...
Like, āHans, he works at...ā Like, what do you say?
Hans Swildens:
Yeah. So we have, um... Itās actually kinda nice because we- weāre gonna keep our brand as a team.
Each one of the teams in our d- in our division has their own brand, and the funds are, have their own fund name, and so weāre gonna keep Industry Ventures. Just like thereās, the Goldman Sachs Petershill team, thereās the Goldman Sachs Industry Ventures team, and thereās the Goldman Sachs Vintage team. So yeah.
So the, the brand will continue to live on and, but weāre operating within, GSAM, and then within GSAM, the group that weāre in is the External Investing Group.
Turner Novak:
And so I think you mentioned before that you think you may have, the biggest secondaries portfolio, or at least one of the largest in the world. What is, what is kind of the scale of the business today just in terms of, how many funds, the capital, the relationships you have?
Hans Swildens:
Yeah. So we combining it with, the XIG team, we believe that we have one of the largest portfolios of venture capital funds and, investments in the world. Weāve, weāve, we did all the aggregation.
We are, weāve, weāve kind of organized it all, and weāve got a bunch of IT systems as well as people, and whatnot that, are being applied to this. But the, um... So thereās an effort that weāre working on called, VC at GS.
And so at a high level, before the transaction, we had eight and a half billion of capital from institutional investors. Thatās pension funds, endowments, foundations, family offices and, and hospitals and whatnot. And XIG has over 500 billion.
And when you look at, what we had before, we had 325, venture firm relationships- And then we had 850 venture funds, the partnerships that we owned a part of. When we when we did the aggregation, then we had, we had some overlap, but like, because weāre so heavy on the small fund side of the market and they were heavy on the large fund side of the market, when you combine it we added approximately another 200 firm relationships. So we went up to 525 or so approximate firms that we are a limited partner in their funds.
And then itās, itās, itās almost 1,600 venture funds. So, and itās over 22 billion of commitments. And so I was struggling to find another group that had a portfolio this large, both in terms of firm count, fund count, and commitment size.
And, I actually spent a little time with, with the CEO of Cambridge Associates when I was down at Milken a couple weeks ago, and he said that their client portfolios Have 40 billion of commitments to venture funds. So, if you look at, if you look at, theyāre one of the largest kind of endowment foundation consultants. And if you look at their whole network and aggregate it has about 40.
But thereās not many of us in the world, and they theyāre the ones that everyone points to the indexes, right? āCause they produce benchmarks and indexes on funds because of their client portfolios. But we have a similar capability now, right? āCause we have s- we have, we have so much of the market in our, in our group in terms of the data flow, the reporting, the, all the investment back and forth with not only the people, but also, all the information, that we actually can start doing things like aggregated, industry level.
Turner Novak:
Oh, yeah. I was gonna ask. You should, you should start doing that.
Hans Swildens:
Weāre looking at it. I mean, I think weāre gonna... We did it ourselves before, just for our own benefit.
Weāre not sure that the market needs another index.
Turner Novak:
Another benchmark report.
Hans Swildens:
Yeah. But we were already doing it ourselves, right? Because when we invest into a new venture fund, or we are buying an LP out of a fund, or weāre buying a portfolio, or buying a direct investment and whatnot, we look at all of our analytics and everything across everything we own.
So we have, we already have, general statistics around, overall DPI in the market year by year, out-performance against averages at small, medium, large size funds. You know, call, capital call pace, distribution pace, TVPI metrics. So we have a lot of that here at Ray, and we...
You know, ācause we do a lot of analysis on the funds and the
Turner Novak:
Companies every day. And y- Iām assuming, thereās... So this is one of the things you can do with scale.
Like, is there anything else, being this large that it just kinda, allows you to operate a little bit differently than maybe a different player in the space?
Hans Swildens:
Yeah, we think weāve got a bunch of advantages by being, having scale. And one of the advantages is our market, as you know, right, is a very, relationship driven curated market where deals- Deals are kind of curated, right? So by having scale, weāll have more deal flow and more proprietary deal flow.
And then in addition to that, once you work with firms over a long period of time and built trust and participated in their funds and participated in their companies and helped them with liquidity structures and issues, and even talked to them about their firm at a management company level of how to, how to grow that, they m- a lot of venture funds add you to these restricted lists, so they kind of restrict transfers in their partnerships. And so that gives us an advantage if weāre on all those lists. And, itās the same thing on the company side of the market where companies are curating now whoās buying their shares, whoās...
Obviously, who participates in the rounds. And, and with scale and relationships, the market, you can traverse it easier. You know, we have a, we have, we w- If you think about what we do here in our team, itās a multidimensional investment strategy.
So, weāre not only, talking to the companies, weāre, talking to the funds, weāre also talking to the LPās in the funds, and weāre also talking to the non-venture investors in the companies, corporate CVCās, hedge funds, mutual funds, family offices. So when you look at, the dimensional aspect of what weāre doing, itās actually quite fascinating. And as you get scale, you can just see the cube more,
Turner Novak:
Right? Whatās been the most interesting thing, as youāve gotten the scale, whether this was recently or even, 10 years ago? Was there, anything that really changed your mind on something, or changed the way you look at the world, or think about the strategy of the firm getting that viewpoint?
Actually, thatās
Hans Swildens:
One of the best things about this job. Iāve been doing this 26 years, and every day I learn. And thatās what keeps me excited to come in and everything.
Itās like, itās such in a fascinating job in business. Iāve learned so much and Iām, Iām learning even, eh, today Iām sure Iāll learn some- something from you. But, the, thereās just a long list.
In terms of, the companies and kind of the power line in the companies, thereās a lot, bunch of learnings there. In terms of the funds, the risk levels in the funds, the portfolio construction in the funds, the stage of the funds, how the funds source investments that are proprietary that create outsized returns and the power law dynamic. I mean, thereās just, I
Turner Novak:
Mean, thereās just thousands of things to learn. Of course. Maybe we need to do a separate podcast of, the thousand things that youāve learned, over the past 26
Hans Swildens:
Years. Probably 5,000. Okay.
Like, Iād say one of the, one of the number one thing Iād probably have learned is that no matter how smart you are, and no matter how good you are- Thereās always things that happen in companies, in, in portfolios, and at firms that you canāt predict. And, and I think over time, the people that have been doing this for a long time, itās just very humbling. āCause you can be right and be right for a really long time, and then be completely wrong later. And it could, it could be your fault or it could not be your fault.
But in terms of just understanding that things can go wrong and, and for, a lot of reasons. And then that... Iād say how you construct a portfolio to understand how to get rid of that risk, so you donāt over-concentrate your portfolio on certain things at certain stages. āCause the risk, the risk and the humbling effect is higher as you get closer to seed investing.
So thereās like a, thereās like a green to red risk level bar that sits next to, how youāre constructing your portfolio and then how humbling it is. āCause if you do crossover investing and stuff, you can have loss rates of 10 to 20%. If youāre doing seed investing and formation stage investing, you can have loss rates of 60, 70%. And so, and you know as well as anyone, thereās a lot of ways to lose money.
And, fortunately weāre learning less of that, but weāre still learning it. And I think kind of over time, itās just very humbling, this market.
Turner Novak:
Interesting. Okay. Well, so then maybe this is an interesting question in terms of the, the risk appropriate levels of portfol- or the appropriate levels of risk portfolio construction-wise for a seed stage fund.
How would you approach thinking through, this is a good setup for a seed fund today?
Hans Swildens:
Yeah. I think it depends on the type of seed fund. So I think that thereās categories of seed funds and, we have a- We have a certain type of portfolio construction we like because of what we do.
But that doesnāt mean that the portfolio construction that we donāt like wonāt work. It just means it might not be the best fit for us. So if you think about us, everyone has their shtick, right?
I mean, we are funding new seed funds. Weāve got a portfolio of over 150 managers today. Weāve seeded almost 100 of them, and the other 50, we bought secondaries in them and maybe done a staple or, a new primary in the new fund to fill the hole of the old LP.
But, if you think about that portfolio, we do have one of the largest seed fund portfolios in the world. And a lot of... Thereās, they they kind of fall into different buckets.
You know, thereās the founder-led seed fund, which is kind of what, when I started, I was kind of, kind of like me, right? I started a software company, as you know, with my brother. I sold it.
I started another software company, and then I started investing. So thereās kind of the founder coming from the founder side of the market seed fund. They act a certain way and, and source deals in a certain way thatās different than the other categories.
Then thereās the, spin out of Kleiner or Sequoia or Andreesen or whoever. And, thereās sole GPās, thereās multi, multi GP spin-outs and they come from the investment side of the market and theyāre investing and constructing a portfolio a little differently. And then you have kind of the third side, which is like just rapid spray and pray, large in index portfolios at the seed stage, and then trying to capture, the 10, 20% of that portfolio that is performing and then concentrating capital in there.
So itās a different way to do it. And, and that could either be some, someone whoās coming from the founder side, coming from the VC side, even coming from the LP side of the market or the CVC side of the market or hedge fund. And so, yeah, so weāve seen it.
Weāve seen that people construct portfolios and source, transactions and, investments differently. We, the one-- we like both the founder led side as well as the spin-out side. We donāt like the indexed side as much.
What do you like and dislike about those? Well, so if you think about us, so when-- I think one of the things venture fund managers should learn if... ācause I actually didnāt know myself. It took me a while to- Okay.
You gotta understand your LP. Hmm. Yep.
Thereās different types of LPās, and they all want different things, right? A pension fund manager is more of an allocator. You know, a fund of funds or someone seeding funds is maybe looking also for co-investments and secondaries like us.
You know, thereās, thereās LPās that are, only looking for brand name funds and donāt wanna invest into new venture funds. You know, thereās all different types of LPās, right? And they all want different things.
So one thing I learned early on is when I started calling to raise capital was like, what do they want? And do the-- which category of LPās want what I have? And then, that actually will change as your firm develops, which is something people donāt talk about very much.
But the LPās that are in your first fund and your LPās that are in your second fund, are a different type of LP thatās gonna be in your tenth fund. And so you actually have to change who youāre talking to over time and develop different types of LPās as youāre scaling and growing your firm. And nobody really talks about that, but thatās, thatās kind of a whole, a whole thing that probably should be
Turner Novak:
Described better to venture managers. So how would you describe the process of doing that? Like, if I asked you, āHey, how do I transition and think about scaling my LP base or evolving my LP base?ā Anything youāve kind of, picked up on as best practices?
Hans Swildens:
Yeah. I learned a lot there ācause I wasted a lot of time, like most in, GPās, talking to the wrong people. And so I would say I probably wouldāve saved a couple...
So Iāve been doing this 26 years. I probably wouldāve saved a couple years of my life in terms of just literally- Like, time spent? Talking to the wrong people.
Mm-hmm. Damn. Whatād you mess up?
Itās a big... Itās like talking to the wrong entrepreneurs, right? So a couple things.
One thing that I that I learned was, and Iāve... You know, we work with all these seed stage funds and new formations and everything every day, emerging managers, and most donāt understand it. First, this really is a sales game.
Itās really a, itāll be agent driven, but not, historically was a CRM driven pipeline sales. You gotta think about raising capital for your funds as a... Youāre a salesperson.
Youāre doing outbound. Youāve got leads. Youāve got qualified leads, unqualified leads.
Youāve got, highly likely to, to invest, and then youāve gotta layer onto that things that you would normally do if youāre a salesperson. Like, āHave you ever done a fund like mine before? Did you like it?
Was it successful? Would you like to look at another one?ā And then just kind of weed through the, 10,000 LPās to understand which thousand fit for you, right? And then focus there.
And then what ha- and the thousand that will be a fit for you in your fund one, fund two, fund three, kind of where you are today, are not gonna be... Very few are gonna be an awesome fit for you when youāre on fund 10 and your fundās 800 million or whatever it is, ācause itās just a different type of investor, right? The ones that are funding you in fund one, two, and three are looking for, high multiple, high risk, emerging manager, as well as they wanna get, spend time with you and do some co-investments with you, a lot of them, and kind of use you and you use them for learning and access to whatever youāre doing and whatever theyāre doing.
The fund 10 LPās, a lot of them will be pretty passive, right? Theyāll write you a $50 million check, $100 million check, and if theyāre a large US pension or theyāre a large US endowment, they might not have the capability or interest in doing any co-investments at all because they canāt due to their
Turner Novak:
Internal investment processes. Yeah. Itās interesting.
Some people love that we do co-invest and we raise SPVs, and some people hate when you say that. Yeah, of course.
Hans Swildens:
So I think you gotta, you gotta create this, the CRM systemās a must-do. One of the managers I met with that was creating a fund, when I described that to him, and he kinda laughed and shrugged it off and said, āHey, I donāt need to do that. You know, Iām gonna raise my fund in three to six months, and itāll be done.
You know, Iāve got a, X, Y, Z is gonna anchor my fund, and Iāll be done.ā And I was like, āWell, itās like there is, 1% to 2% of the managers that do that, okay? But 90-99% of the managers take a long time to raise their first fund. Itās not something thatās just, easy.ā And so I said, āYou should probably start, tracking all this in a CRM system.ā And heās like, āNah, I wonāt need to.ā Iām like, āOkay, great.ā And then he calls me back like six months later, he calls me back and he goes, āWhat CRM system
Turner Novak:
Do you use?ā What do you use? What was the answer? We use Dual Cloud.
Dual Cloud, okay.
Hans Swildens:
Iāve,
Turner Novak:
Iāve heard of it but Iāve never used it.
Hans Swildens:
Yeah. I mean, Affinity didnāt exist when we started, and I think thatās kind of a next-gen product now that people are using. But yeah, we use Dual.
We started actually with, a micro- Microsoft CRM. That didnāt work great. It didnāt scale, and so we switched it to Salesforce.
I mean, thatās a long time, so you know that shows how old we are. Salesforce was sexy back in the day. We did.
We s- we used Salesforce, and we constructed our own data model and had all of our own analytics flowing through there, and we were, auto-generating analytics off of our, our force. com data model. Oh, interesting. Yeah.
We had a pretty sophisticated- Salesforce implementation. And then we moved it all into DealCloud And, and modified it
Turner Novak:
So this, this setup that you had, what were the most important things to do when you, when you, when you talk about, the analytics? Like, what were you getting? Because someone might say, āItās a, itās a CRM.ā Like, itās like, what are you...
What kind of anal- analysis are you doing?
Hans Swildens:
I mean, we... So I you know, I came from being a software entrepreneur, so itās very different, right? Like, I didnāt come from being VC or a endowment manager or whatever.
So weāve always... And the companies Iāve dealt with were mostly infrastructure software. So when we went into this thing, we were like, āHow can we build a systematic, repeatable data set that we can leverage over time and grow to make what we do, better?ā To help us learn, too, about, from our mistakes, to help us learn from, what went right and wrong, and then become a better investor over time, as well as just leverage data so we donāt have to redo our work every time.
So in terms of what we did at that point, we had a model that we built, which, when we were analyzing a fund, you- youād put in, all the metrics in the fund, and you get it from the audit and get it from the quarterly report in terms of the fund size and kind of amount of capital called, dis- how much distributed, blah, blah. Then you go into the SOI, which is all the underlying companies, input in the cost, the nav, the ownership, the enterprise value at entry, the enterprise value at nav, and then, youāre trying to predict-
Turner Novak:
You were manually typing all this in? Yeah. You can use AI today, yeah.
Hans Swildens:
I donāt know. Thatās, thatās, thatās actually the funny thing, is weāre kind of in this new phase of having this all being automated. But, and then, but go- having that all go into the database and then reusing that later, and so if youāre gonna look at the same fund later or if youāre gonna look at, investing in a new fund later, you can look at the old fund.
If youāre looking at investing in one of the companies directly, you can pull the old context. And having, the funds map to the companies, and having it so that, all your company informationās auto-filling into the fund analysis and having all that fund analysis auto input into the company analysis. And then have the, funds linked into the LPās in the funds, so you know who see-through owns the companies in the funds, in the, and also through the, to the LPās.
I think, very few people, what Iāve found over a long time doing this, have that sort of visibility and, and are tying the company data and the performance at a company level quarter for quar- quarter after quarter with the funds and with the SOIs in the funds, and then theyāre not, doing the multidimensional linking into, the LPās and into the other people. And so itās like, itās like seeing the cube, right? Maybe thatās my highlight here, is just the, the data set is, is super interesting once you can see it in a multidimensional way And then if you can invest into it in a multidimensional way too, itās actually very unique.
Because most people are only investing into one dimension. So when you can invest into any dimension, it ends up being fascinating because you can see things that other people can see, and you can understand things other people canāt understand.
Turner Novak:
And it sounds like, the LP flow-through was important to you because you would potentially be buying some things from... Like, they were also kind of in your world. Like, if for, as a venture manager, you probably donāt need to...
Like, as a GP investing directly in the startups, not, no fund investments at all, no secondaries. The LP flow-through might not be that interesting. But for you it was, because that was, youāre also buying from them in a sense.
Hans Swildens:
Yeah. So when we started, the dot-com collapse happened, and we started buying people out of portfolios of their venture investments. So I bought Enronās venture funds out of bankruptcy, Enro- Enron Broadband Ventures.
I bought InfoSpaceās venture capital funds off their balance sheet. I bought Electronic Data Systems venture division, right off their balance sheet. And so when, when you...
Thatās how, thatās how kinda we formed doing secondaries. And then we started buying fund interests. So, I bought Williams Communications, Will Tellās fund portfolio.
In ā09 I bought, Washington Mutualās, LP portfolio. It was called Strategic Investments. And, and so when you look at, how do you buy this stuff, right?
Itās very difficult because if I get your fund SOI. So, I you know, I bought a secondary in your fund, right? Thatās why weāre talking today And I get your reporting, right?
And youāre showing me, āHey, hereās all my deals.ā Youāre talking about your best deals. Youāve got three funds. Youāre highlighting each one of those in, in the report, or maybe Iāll talk to you and, on the phone or see you and grab coffee or lunch, and we can walk through it or maybe I go to your AGM, and weāre always talking about these things.
If you can capture all the information and understand whatās going on in all these funds at the company level, and then also talk to the companies and verify what the funds are saying, and then also talk to the LPās who are trying to sell part of their funds, right? And if you can understand kind of all that, which is difficult to understand ācause everybody wants to keep their information private. The companies donāt wanna give the information to the public.
The funds donāt wanna give the information to the public, and a lot of the LPās donāt wanna tell anybody that theyāre in the funds. So thereās a, thereās like a barrier to like understand even what it all is, right? Like who owns what.
Now thereās databases, so when we started like 26 years ago, Preqin didnāt exist. PitchBook didnāt exist. Crunchbase didnāt exist.
You know, you couldnāt go into, an LLM and say, āGive me all the LPās in Banana Capital one, two, and three,ā and you know, it probably wonāt spit out much ācause... But itāll spit out something. And, so there was no visibility and databases around this stuff when we started, so we had to like do our own.
Turner Novak:
What When you talked about like the differences between what an investor would say, like the GP and what the company would say, what do you find is like some of the biggest differences between GP saying something and then you talk to like the founder of the company, āYeah, itās, itās not trueā?
Hans Swildens:
Yeah. I mean, that happens. My partnership over time, right?
This is, this is when, experience matters My partnership over time and all the, people that I work with here. And then that affects also how we underwrite their funds, think about their companies theyāre talking about. So part of itās just getting to the point where youāve already...
Like, if youāre invested in Flex, right, in your fund one, and, I go meet Flex, and then theyāre telling me everything about their business, and I can ask them about you and blah, blah. And then youāre gonna tell me about it. You might not know Iām, Iām talking to Flex, right?
And, but I already have context there. Or I might be talking to another manager thatās in Flex, Titanium is in it I think. And so, I can be talking to them, and they tell me one thing.
I talk to you tell me another thing. I talk to the company, they tell me another thing, and then I can start kind of triangulating around, what do I think, right? So the one interesting thing about this job of being a primary investor, a secondary investor, a co-investor, a direct investor, is that you get to talk to all those people.
So you can form your own opinion and your own kind of thesis and underwriting model on whatever youāre gonna invest into, and then you can kind of get everybody elseās opinion on it Typically, GPās are not able to do that, right? Theyāll do it sometimes if youāre a growth stage GP and youāre talking to the seed funds. But what weāve learned over time is what the seed funds are saying to us is gonna be different than what the growth funds say to us, depending on
Turner Novak:
What stage the company is. Really? So whatās the, whatās, what causes the difference?
Because theyāre
Hans Swildens:
Both... When they invested, theyāre both investing completely differently, right? W- you know, oneās going after the entrepreneur, how much, domain experience they have, how much hustle they have, their confidence level in that person or people, if itās a group, to go execute on this awesome opportunity.
And if for some reason they canāt execute, their ability to pivot into a new business. And itās more of a, youāre backing teams and youāre backing people and mar- and, and pr- trying to predict markets. Thatās like the early stage group.
Theyāre not doing comp s- comp analysis, capital market analysis, valuation analysis, CAC and churn, LTV, or any of the, any of the analysis that a growth stage investorās doing, right? I mean, growth stage investors are trying to quantify how much value and growth and profits and, are in a business, and how durable it is, and then projecting it out and trying to pay a value that captures all that growth of revenue and earnings, and they can grow through their price if theyāre paying a high price. So that, a lot of whatās happened in growth is that you have to pay a price above what the current value is of the business.
And so, a lot of them are trying to pay, two, one, two, three years out of that value. But then if they hold the security for seven to 10 years, it compounds and they make their 3x or 5x By just compounded, revenue growth and earnings growth. And so when you talk to them on the, the five things theyāre talking about are completely different, right?
I mean, management team and founderās obviously on the list, ācause thatās critical. But then they go into all the other metrics about the business, right? How healthy is it?
How healthy is, sticky are the customers? What are the margins? Over time, whatās the competitive dynamic?
You know, thereās a lot of like, uh, five forces analysis and, and financial analysis. And then you also have the capital markets analysis for short comparable trading. Whatās, whatās comparable?
What does it look like? How does it compare to whatās being already valued by the public market? How is it how are, how are M&A deals valued?
Is this, whatās the most comparable company to this in an M&A exit? Was it a PE exit? Was it a strategic exit?
How strategic is this? āCause if itās strategic, it might have a higher value. And thatās like what the growth investors are all noodling on all day. And the, and the, and the seed investors literally donāt do that.
Turner Novak:
Yeah. Iāve had one time where somebody asked me, āWhat do you think about, all the, all the competitors to this company?ā And Iām like, āI donāt know any of them.ā Like, they started this company before, they kinda created the category. Thereās no one else, and like, I still donāt know who the competitors are.
Hereās the deal. That is not your job. I should, though.
I probably
Hans Swildens:
Should know. I should be on top of it. I mean, Iāve found, we have found seed managers that are very good growth investors.
But I would say itās less than 20% for sure, and itās probably less than 10%. The skill set of being an awesome seed investor and getting in this, in the deal flow thatās spinning out of whatever, OpenAI now and Anthropic and Google and everybody else, and being with the right talent, with the right people, and seeding them and convincing them that youāre gonna add value and that you should take your money, and having... That skill set is a very different skill set than, leading, a billion-dollar round in the next AI business,
Turner Novak:
Right? Itās very different. And so speaking of that, is that what you think a good seed manager should be doing right now?
Like, should I be trying to... If I if Iām Banana Capital, right, I have a $10 million fund, should I be trying to find the people leaving OpenAI and Anthropic to start the new, vertical AI Neo lab? Or, what do you think kinda makes sense right now at seed?
Because, thereās a lot of stuff going on. Itās a little bit of a crazy time in the world. I think that
Hans Swildens:
The seed market now, itās, itās even more important to have differentiation in how and what youāre sourcing. So for example, you had Oli on here, right? And, with Neo, and, heās got a lot of stuff going on at the, technical founder kind of formation stage, right?
Due to his whole strategy in terms of how heās sourcing deals, what kind of people heās looking for. Heās, heās getting them early, heās watching them, heās, heās... So heās got, heās got an angle, right?
And itās not your angle, right? And so, youāve gotta, have your own angle. I think that thereās also, multiple...
Thereās a lot of angles that work, right? I mean, weāve been in funds that, they were people that worked at Google or wherever, and then they got to know everybody and all the talent and just funded all the best people that left. Thatās an awesome strategy, right? āCause you know the people.
You know what they can do. Youāve worked with them. You trust them.
You know they can build something awesome. You know theyāre probably top.1% in what they do. And, and so, thatās, thatās a good strategy.
I think, thereās a lot of different strategies And a lot will work, but the, the most important thing is to actually have a differentiated one.
Turner Novak:
You know what I mean?
Hans Swildens:
Like, if youāre just another fund thatās got 50 to 200 million bucks and youāre just like, āIām gonna be AI,ā and you have no differentiation, you have no sourcing advantage, you have no access to the best talent advantage, you have no kind of curated deal flow thatās coming from your networks or what youāre doing to generate that, thatās
Turner Novak:
Not interesting. Is that a pretty down the fairway average pitch that you see today? Is like, weāre raising a, weāre $100 million seed fund and weāre investing in AI, and thereās, thereās not enough else around it to make it interesting?
Hans Swildens:
Well, I would say most of what weāre looking at, weāre looking at from referrals from the other managers weāre in. So, weāve been, weāve been, weāve been, weāve been seeding the seed funds now for, since 2007, right? Is when Roland started doing it.
So, and then I started doing it in 2009 and the rest of the team since probably ā09 as well. So the, uh... Since we already have over 100 of them, right?
And theyāre all working together in se- ācause seed rounds are typically syndicated We are getting pointed to people, and people are being introduced to us as a, like weāre a value-added LP. And so I think thereās a brand advantage now we have. But, in terms of, in terms of, what weāre actually putting checks into new managers, most of itās through our current relationships.
If you think about it so in the second bucket, which is spin-outs, weāre in 525 firmsā funds now, and we can... You know, when they spin out, what do they do? A lot of them call some of the investors they had in the funds they got to know.
So I mean, that happens here. And weāre, sometimes weāre in the funds and in the spin-out funds, right? So, weāre in both the main funds that have been around for a long time, and then weāre also in the spin-outs.
And weāre able to determine which spin-out to invest in because we just talk to the, partnership and say, āThereās three GPās that spun out of your firm in the last five years. Which ones have you written checks to, and which ones would you write a check to again?ā So itās like diligence gets easier too, right? So the, the deal flow gets a little easier to see and the diligence gets a little easier to do because youāre having a confidential relationship with everybody in the market anyway Itās the same thing with the companies, right?
In terms of like new founders going out and starting a fund, the probability of us knowing one of their prior venture investors is 90%. So we can just talk to who funded them, you know? What were they like working as a CEO and a founder, and, did they you know, how key were they to the whole thing?
Or did they become a chairman one year after they founded it and were not ever there again? You know, we I mean, itās a very easy,
Turner Novak:
Very easy call. What do you see as one of the biggest mistakes when someoneās doing that, when theyāre starting a fund and they talk to you in like that first, the first conversation? I donāt know if thereās like a lot of patterns or if any one specific very, red flag-type instance stands out, but like what are some of the biggest mistakes peop- you see people make when theyāre kinda putting that first fund together with their LPās?
Iād just
Hans Swildens:
Be humble, right? Like, people that my team meets and I meet that are not humble and not, respectful and not someone youād wanna actually work with, I think thatās a big turnoff. And I think that, a lot of the VCās and new VCās think that they need to come into the LPās and pound their chest and say, āHey, this is how I...
I did this, I did that, I did this, I did that.ā You know, guess what? Like, we meet like 10 people like that every day. So, itās not different, right?
I mean, why people are doing what theyāre doing is ācause they already did that. So itās like what we what we factor in, too, is like, do we wanna work with this person? Do we trust this person?
Do we... If theyāre representing our capital, are we proud of that? You know what I mean?
Are they treating people well, right? Are they a good... Do they create value, right, for the investments they make?
How do they treat other people? And like the last thing an LP wants is to have somebody thatās gonna mistreat them, right? I mean, youāre talking about a 10-year commitment that really is 12 to 15 years if you stick in it the whole time and donāt sell it in secondary as an LP.
And like nobody wants to be 12 years with someone they donāt like and someone they donāt trust And I mean, this is just like, thatās like the worst, right? Itās like being in a bad marriage, right? Youāre just trying to get out.
Right. So yeah, I think, so I think, coming in and, explaining your successes ācause otherwise, itās hard to have a track record to back, but in a way that- I- in a way that is, I guess, just more level with, with the LPās youāre talking to. Hmm.
Turner Novak:
And, this is a slightly different topic, but I didnāt wanna miss it ācause you said it and it was pretty interesting. So you talked about how you... I think this is one of your sh- really early days of industry.
You bought Enronās venture portfolio. So how does that come about? And like how did
Hans Swildens:
That go? So yeah, so I mean, I was a little... So I owned Enron stock, and I got...
Lost my capital in it and I got kinda pissed off, right? I mean, and so I went in and said, āIf this thing is bankrupt, what can I buy from it thatāll make me my money back?ā Right? And thatās how, thatās how that one started.
And so I just went and called everybody that I knew and networked all into the people, and I ended up, going right into the trustee of the bankruptcy and, being aggressive and, digging in the portfolio, and found some, found some investments there I really liked. You know, the second company I had with my brother was called Speedera Networks, and it was a content delivery network. And so we basically, we dropped in, servers in all these different locations in the world, and we had a caching system and then we you know, bought bandwidth, resold it through our, overlay network to speed up everybodyās videos and, so you could listen to like, like iTunes.
We served iTunes, we served Netflix, we served DoubleClick, all that stuff to, get the, get... So thereās no buffering and you can get videos to people and large files to people quickly. So- And this was back
Turner Novak:
When the internet was slow, right? This is, this is like in the late ā90s, I think.
Hans Swildens:
Yeah, we started, Speedera in 1999, and we competed directly with Akamai. We ended up getting acquired by Akamai, so itās part of Akamai. But, the broadband, they called it Enron Broadband Ventures, right?
So, some of the stuff they owned in there, we knew. So, I... You know, one of the assets was Interxion, which was the largest data center in Europe.
And they had a, they had a, they had an ownership in it. So we kinda dug through the whole thing and negotiated a deal to buy the whole portfolio. And, it ended up being a good transaction.
You know, the thing that I missed there, though, Iāve missed a lot of stuff, but the one thing thatās interesting that I missed is they showed me the data center that was built in Vegas, ācause it was also part of the bankruptcy, and it was also part of this, broadband division, and they said, āDo you wanna buy that thing, too?ā And I was like, āWell, let me check it out.ā And it was, a fully built- Kind of amazing next gen data center sitting on, one of the hubs of the internet in Vegas, but it was empty and it was losing money ācause it ha- it didnāt have any customers yet, and it was, just brand new, spanking new thing with nothing in it. So I looked at it and said, āHey, thatās a real estate deal, like Iām buying, tech stuff.ā And I didnāt realize that, that thing. So there was a entrepreneur that bought it and it became Switch.
And when he bought it Pablo got together some money to buy it and then he he actually signed a lease. He leased the entire thing out to eBay And heās creating a multi- multibillion-dollar data center business. Heās one of, one of the largest data center...
Turner Novak:
Oh, wow. Imagine telling someone that today, that you passed on an empty data center that was ready to go and you didnāt invest in it today.
Hans Swildens:
I mean, I didnāt understand at that point that I should be buying that. It just, it just looked like a hole in the ground. I did the same thing with Whammo where they had, they had a conference center right next to the airport in SeaTac that theyād owned, and I was in the...
I was buying their venture portfolio, and theyāre like, āHey, we have a wind farm we own.ā They owned a wind farm asset, and they owned, this conference. And like I said, there was a hotel in it. It was huge.
It was huge. Itās like, and a family bought it killed it. But it was like a dis- itās distressed ācause they were using it as their corporate kind of hotel, conference, meeting center next to the airport so you didnāt have to go up to Seattle.
And so youād fly in, ācause, Whammo was so big, you would just go over to their, kind of corporate, conference and meeting and hotel. And it was huge. Center, that thing, when it when it you know, when it went bankrupt, it was, it was empty.
And, some of the hotel had some, had some people staying at it though. And, but it was just one big loss, looked like a hole in the ground. And, a family bought it and I think they I think they made,
Turner Novak:
$250 million. And this was just sitting there for you in the bankruptcy and you didnāt take it?
Hans Swildens:
Yeah, but I didnāt have it left. At that point I was just struggling with trying to build this thing and fund it and, buy investments. Just so focused on buying the venture investments, I wasnāt thinking
Turner Novak:
About the other assets. And th- and was this, pre-fund? Were you still investing off of your own dollars, or had you, had you raised, outside capital yet?
No, we had, we, at that point, uh, we were doing SPVs. Okay. So you were like deal by deal.
Youād go and like Iām gonna raise the, 5 million, whatever the number is, to buy this Enron portfolio that is at like 1% of cost or something like that.
Hans Swildens:
Yep. Thatās exactly right, and we put actually the Enron deal and the Infos Bill- Infospace deal into one fund. We ended up doing two deals in one SPV.
Oh, wow. It was scrappy. I mean, most of these firms, by the way, and you probably know this, but if not, like most firms, even larger ones, when they formed it was a scrappy situation, right?
Itās like entrepreneurial. I think that entrepreneurial finance is underappreciated. And I also think, by the way, Goldmanās history and teams and how theyāve been an entrepreneurial finance business is extremely underappreciated because everyone views the firm as like a bank or a financial institution or investment bank or an asset manager and they donāt understand all the innovation and kinda creativity around creating new products, creating new businesses, entering new markets, and doing entrepreneurial finance activities.
And I think thatās one of the things that has been eye-opening for me going from being an entrepreneur, with my own funds and stuff, to a firm that is large, that has a lot of fund teams, that has a lot of different business units, that has developed markets, right? Theyāve been... Theyāve done what...
A lot of the people in there that are senior in the org have built businesses from scratch inside the firm. And so, thatās one thing thatās kind of underappreciated with some of these asset managers, if you wanna call them, or investment banks or financial institutions is, where did you think the businesses came from? You know what I mean?
They didnāt just show up. Like, itās, itās, they had to be created by somebody. And to be like a number one player in a segment, you need to be early, you need to be innovative, and you need to be competitive.
And, and so thereās an entrepreneurial aspect to it.
Turner Novak:
Do you think that there are gonna be more, acquisition of venture firms over the next, I donāt know, whatever the time period is? Or like is this, is this a trend thatās, thatās gonna really start to take off or?
Hans Swildens:
Itās already been one, I would say Will it will it accelerate? Itās probably gonna keep its current pace. I mean, youāre, youāre gonna see other, firms in the venture growth space be acquired for sure.
I mean, I would say if you look at the, if you look at the asset management landscape, none of these firms were publicly traded until like 10, 20 years ago, right? So, you have a, you have a new cohort of, asset management firms that are publicly traded. Some of them came from the buyout market, some of them came from the credit market, some of them came from the real estate market, some of them came from multiple parts of the market.
And then theyāve added new businesses to their, entrepreneurial, finance again. Theyāve added new business units. Theyāve added new ways to make money.
Theyāve added new strategies. For example, there was sports investing was a new category, right? Buying minority equity positions in s- in professional sporting teams.
That was a new thing that happened over the last 10 years. Thatās now in, KKR, for example. And, Apollo and Ares have efforts.
The GP stakes business of like, hey, you have these private GPās that are like you and like I was, but can you fund them, right, as an equity investor and be a growth investor or a venture investor into the GPās, which are the fund managers? And what does that, how does that, how does that investment structure look? How does, how do you make money on that?
How do you deal with kind of over time monetizing it? You know, thatās all was a new category in the last 15 years. And so, these businesses are being built in an entrepreneurial way, and theyāre adding new business units in different categories.
But if you look at the macro trends. Everyone has a pretty sophisticated buyout mar- ma- business. Everyone has a pretty sophi-- uh, most have a sophist- pretty sophisticated real estate business now.
Most have a pretty sophisticated credit business, right, today. And so when you look at, where they have a... Most of them also are having an infrastructure, business in terms of funding infrastructure through funds.
And, and so who has a venture growth business, right? I mean, thereās a, thereās a lot of holes in these asset managers as a, as a, a, as a... āCause, ācause they wanna ha- Theyāre building multi-asset management firms that can leverage a corporate infrastructure of accounting, finance, compliance, fundraising. Thereās all these services and people and technology needed to execute and help execute fund strategies, and they have the infrastructure for that.
And so if they can add boutiques in different areas and then leverage all that, itās actually a win-win for both the investment manager thatās the boutique as well as the, larger corporate thatās scaling. And so, so I think that youāre gonna see more and more of these. I mean, I know ācause Iāve been talking to all of them, and some of the CEOās are in my fund as LPās afterwards and, and still.
And so theyāre all looking at venture growth, trying to figure out how to do it I would say thereās a lot of struggle with, a lot of them struggle with the scalability issue. Thereās a, thereās a scale issue. Like, if youāre gonna, if youāre gonna rank it and youāre gonna say, āHey, would I rather do data center business that can be huge and fund all the new AI data centers or do a venture business?ā Like, a lot of them are like, āMeh, Iāll do the data center business.ā So itās like a ranking of like what are they you know, what are they what are they looking for?
Turner Novak:
Yeah. Like Iāve seen, Iāve seen multiple times people proclaim, like the CEO of an asset management business on a stage at a conference, right? They proclaim that, data centers and compute is like the biggest asset class ever in humanities, in history.
So, you should fund that. Without the AI wave, weād have flat GDP. Yeah.
Well, so one question based on that line of thinking is why acquire someone, like letās say like Banana Capital, I get acquired by like, I donāt know, Oxif or like just like some pub- I donāt know, like a publicly traded like hedge fund or whatever. So you have a meeting business,
Hans Swildens:
And then you have your investment business, and so you do, you do probably have some enterprise value,
Turner Novak:
Right, in your business. I think itās actually a lot higher than what other people would pay. Like, in my mind, Iām like, this is like extremely valuable.
I would n- I would never sell this, and someone might look at it and be like, āYeah, hereās your P&L. Like, Iāll give you a million bucks for it.ā And Iām like, āNo way.ā Like, thatās not, Iām not doing it.
Hans Swildens:
And thatās how I felt, and then some, I decided to at one point sell it right? But we still have ownership moving forward in our carried interest pools and things, so itās a little different ācause youāve got two different... So, these fund businesses have two different, revenue streams.
Youāve got your, management fee revenue, and youāve got your carried interest profit sharing revenue. And, and what... Those can be decoupled, right?
So you can, you can have, a partner in your management fee revenue, but theyāre not a partner in your, in your, in your carried interest, and then you can have the reverse, which is partners in your carried interest, but not in your management fee. Hmm. I didnāt think about that.
Yeah, thatās what makes these businesses really interesting is, thereās, thereās two different, and one is long-term capital gains if you hold the securities long enough. The other one is short-term, ordinary income. And depending on what state youāre in, that matters a lot, right?
So, and, but it but by holding securities longer than three years or five years and, funding the securities early, you can h- you can, you can claim long-term capital gains on your investments.
Turner Novak:
At everything net of tax. And do you... So you think it will mostly be acquisitions of these firms, not people starting it internally?
Like, the... āCause Goldman kind of already had one internally. Itās
Hans Swildens:
Both. Yeah. I mean, our team internally here, not our team, but the, the group Iām in looked at doing this themselves, of course, right?
Why would, why would... You know, if youāre gonna buy something, you have to consider building it. And the challenge with building this is, is pretty, pre- itās a pretty hard challenge, right?
It takes... It took us, two decades to get approved and into the market to scale. It...
Maybe we were at scale at, after, 10 to 15 years and, but 25 years later, weāve been at scale with information flow and things for probably about 10 years, but it took over 15 years to get there. And I think, I think the... So thereās a barrier to just being in the, in the market, right?
Owning all the funds, having transferred into all of them. And then thereās also a technology barrier to, how youāre processing that data, how youāre, how youāre using that data for making investments. Then thereās actually the o- thereās the other thing, which is really a pain, which is, getting the right capital, right, from the LPās, and having scale and for raising capital to fund and grow your business, both in terms of your profit pools and the carry, plus your management fee and earnings.
And so you need a base. And then thereās the track record, which by the way, as you know, is the hardest thing in this market. Itās the chicken and the egg thing that is the, the, the thing, which is are you proven to make money over cycles, right?
Have you proven in a 20-year period, through multiple cycles of multiple drawdowns, capital market crises, GFC, COVID, everything, that your funds will make money and compound at rates that are appropriate for the risk and the, and the lockup? And so thereās the track record, and that relates to investment management, and it relates to, experience in your team. And so all those things, are difficult, right?
Because you have to have expertise, you have to have... The, the way we do things, it just takes a long time to get it to a point where itās systematic and repeatable and scalable. If we were just a small fund and we had, 50 million bucks and we had no systematic repeatable stuff, no one would wanna invest with us or buy it right?
So a lot of itās about creating... I mean, this is actually something I have a lot of conversations with managing partners that are managing firms Because I actually went and created, a management company and a holding company, and then looked at it like an entrepreneur would, which is an enterprise value and, and then... And how to create, enterprise value, right, at the firm level.
Most VCās donāt think about that, which is shocking. But so they... The irony of this is that VCās fund entrepreneurs, right, to create enterprise value, but they donāt think about their own enterprise value.
Theyāre funding their firm, but theyāre not thinking their firm as a, as a firm. They think of it as, an LLC or something. Yeah.
I mean, it technically is. It- Well, I know, but, it the, but it ha- but you can convert it into a limited partnership, which you should, and that creates, a different tax structure as well as, you can start, creating more of a firm, ācause you can share partnership interests with others easily compared to an LLC which is difficult to cut up, weigh, or share with it, ācause it creates tax issues. Itās,
Turner Novak:
Itās funny, you see a lot of entrepreneurs will comment on, thereās these VCās that are like, theyāre backing, AGI, and then you talk to, their firm is just, some dude sending emails, sit around a table. Itās like the opposite of the technology business. So one, I think, interesting question is today, we havenāt really talked about the secondary market much today, but how do you think about the secondary market today?
Like, what is kind of... What is it I guess? We actually never really defined, what a secondary transaction is for someone whoās never heard this word before, and then, how big is the market?
How does it work just for someone whoās kinda coming into this for the first time?
Hans Swildens:
Yeah. This was, for me when I... When after the dot-com collapse, which was, at that point, we were in a market, the venture capital business, the industry itself, was primarily a primary investment business.
Where you bought shares from the
Turner Novak:
Company.
Hans Swildens:
The LPās were buying, a partnership interest when the fund started with nothing in it in a primary investment. The funds, the managers were buying into the companies directly when the, to fund them with the capital for a primary investment. When I started doing this, that was pretty much the whole market There didnāt really exist a functional secondary market, right?
The first year I started doing it there was $250 million of secondary, as we estimated, transacted in the entire year. So itās very small, right? Because it just didnāt exist.
It was like a nascent thing. That could be like a single Series A today. Oh, just, tiny.
I mean, just one continuation fund now, like weāre looking, weāre looking at one right now, itās 700 bitty million dollars. Just one deal. Itās bigger...
Three times larger than the whole market was in 2020-- 2001, sorry. So yeah, so but whatās happened is, and this has been just fascinating and just, exciting and interesting, just like every other software market or technology market or whatever market, it developed and grew over time and had multiple segments develop. And so just like venture is segmented into seed, early growth, crossover, buyout, tech buyout, ācause it has segmented now, right?
And now you have funds that are in each one of those segments focusing on those segments, or they have full stack, platforms focusing on all the segments. When 26 years ago there wasnāt that. It was, āHey, your fund should be small, no more than like 400 million, and youāre doing primary investing.ā Thatās the whole market.
We didnāt have crossovers. We didnāt have, had not many hedge funds. We didnāt have...
The corporates were like Intel was the biggest one. You know, it just didnāt look like today. But whatās happened is the secondary market also, developed in-into a huge market, and then also segmented.
And so, and the segmentation in the secondary market is different than the primary market, interestingly. Because the segment- the segmentation in the primary market is segmented by stage, right? When you invest, itās by stage, right?
And, and in the secondary market, itās actually by transaction type And ācause you have pretty much one transaction type, right? Itās like you buy the stock from the company and it issues it to you. In the secondary market, we have transaction types based on different types of securities and different counterparties of sellers.
So our segmentation in the secondary market, it started as like corporate CVCās that youāre buying out and then some hedge funds and mutual funds, and then it went to like venture funds selling some things. So like there was this Facebook moment when there was a count issue in Facebook and, there was a regulatory count that you had in terms of number of shareholders and they were gonna break it so they had to have a secondary process to keep their count, into the regulatory window. And then they had VCās started selling, Facebook stock pre-IPO.
And, and thatās when the other VC said, āWait, I can sell my venture stock pre-IPO? Someoneās gonna buy that?ā And then the whole, institutional VC market started selling stock. It started slow, right now itās, all over the place.
And they started buying the stock too, by the way. So both selling and buying. And so when you look at the segmentation today, we have things like direct secondary market, which is one-off direct secondaries.
So if you wanna buy XYZ shares in XYZ company, and you can go directly into either from the founders, from the employees, from the tender offer into the company, from a venture fund, from a CVC or whatever, just one-off. Like, I want XYZ stock, and you just buy the securities from whoeverās selling them. Thatās direct secondaries.
Then youāve got continuation funds. So these are venture funds that are at the end of their life or ha- donāt have much DPI, and a secondary manager like us can go in and buy and restructure the partnership itself by tendering the LPās, restructuring the re-re-we ame- re-amend the LPA. You know, create a new term, a new set of, a new set of, time periods, as well as a new set of, GP-LP economics.
We can even... We can take the partnership agreement and just amend it and modify it and red line it or we can create a new partnership, and then it is buying everything from the old partnership, and you just do a transfer affiliate from one partnership to another, and youāre still the manager of, from one to the other, right? Is youāre the still the manager, so itās an affiliate of yours.
And so thereās different ways to do this, continuation fund. You know, taking a partnership that owns securities that are 15 years old and great, and they, ācause they wanted to stay private longer and whatever. Theyāre one of the top 20 companies in the world in enterprise value that are venture funded, and you, put them in a continuation fund.
So thereās that part of the market. And then thereās a, thereās part of the market which direct portfolios that are being bought without a GP attached. Okay?
And so, a hedge fund portfolio and the hedge fund wonāt manage it anymore. They just wanna take the private securities in their hedge fund and just blow them all out at once, for example, to be a pure play public market investor again. Or they got overweighted in it right?
Then thereās the LP-led secondary market, which is LPās selling to another LP as secondary, or LPās selling an entire portfolio of LP interests, like a whole portfolio of funds at once. Then thereās also structured equity solutions. This is one...
I mean, there are so many different segments. Iāve never heard of this before. Yeah, the structured equity solutions, thatās actually a big part of the market.
Itās not debt, but it looks like debt in a way because itās structured equity, and so thereās a structured return to it and those things are typically on top of portfolios. So like, so like if you are a pension fund and youāve got a billion dollars of private equity or venture or whatever, what you do is you just transfer all these things into an LLC or a partnership thatās now, you own that, 100% of it. And then someone comes in the partnership and restructures it with a preferred equity tranche that is, compounding...
Thatās a compounding pick, and then a participation on the distributions. So it looks like a loan, but itās not a loan, itās a preferred equity... It looks like a Warren Buffett kind of deal, where itās like, āHey, weāll drop a preferred on top with a interest rate, minimum return threshold,ā and then thereās a pr- you know, a profit share on the back end of the, of the, of the net asset
Turner Novak:
Value when it gets distributed. So this is like itās, it accrues interest like debt would, but you donāt have to actually pay. It just like increases the balance over time.
Hans Swildens:
You can do it either way. You can have, you can have it pay interest or not pay interest. You can, you can have it be non-interest bearing for five years and then pay interest.
It... You can, this, it, you can structure it however you want. Itās just a, special situation structured equity instrument.
And then thereās the debt side. So thereās the loans. So thereās actually like secondary loans.
So like loans against your common stock if youāre an employee to have an option exercise. You know, thereās, thereās loans against portfolios, right? The 25% loan to value on top of a private equity venture portfolio.
You know, thereās a, thereās the actual debt structures too to get liquidity to people. I mean, there, this whole thing got developed into a massive business. We think last year there was Probably over $150 billion of transactions that closed just in venture growth.
And so itās approaching the size of the whole primary business. And weāve had a thesis for 20 years. Itās taken a long time, but itās been cagering at a amazing rate for the, for... āCause it went from nothing to, 150 bill.
But we think thereās a, an argument that the secondary market will be a multiple of the size of the primary market. Because every other equity, every other equity or debt asset class, that is the case. So if you look at, if you look at the stock market, itās all secondaries.
If you look at the, real estate market, itās predominantly secondaries. If you look at the debt markets, itās predominantly secondaries, right? I mean, everyoneās trading whatās already been built or already created or issued.
And so we think that over time, that this market will be larger than the primary market.
Turner Novak:
Is it probably bigger than most people think it is? Like, is the size of the market that shows up in reports most likely underreported?
Hans Swildens:
Yes. And why thatās the case is because brokers have been the ones historically that reported the market, and the brokers in the secondary market predominantly broker private equity secondaries, and it used to be predominantly only the LP-led secondaries. Now theyāre doing the LP-led and the GP-led, which are the continuation funds, and theyāre predominantly doing them in private equity, real estate, infrastructure and whatnot, and to a lesser extent, venture.
Venture, they do capture venture deals, but a lot of them are through these multi-asset portfolio sales. And, and a lot of whatās being transacted in the venture business is never registered through a broker and not registered with the government. Itās just being registered in the private partnerships and in the private equity structures.
And so it doesnāt have to be reported. And so itās like, itās like, itās, itās very hard to track. And so, if youāre just looking at, brokers brokering LP stakes and looking at that size of the market or continuation funds and LP stakes, youāre missing, a massive part of the market.
Theyāre not even reporting the direct secondary market. So they donāt report the tenders in the companies, for example, which is now obviously a huge market. And so what you have to do in this market, which weāve, weāve got frustrated and made our own reports over time, is like break all these segments down, size them all, and then, add it all up in a bar chart to get your aggregated market size.
Turner Novak:
Okay. What, what are like the biggest sections of this? Like, whereās the most capital moving right now?
Is it the LP-led? Is it the GP side? Is it like the direct from the company and the employee side?
Or is it all, is it kind of like one-thirds each? All three of those. Yeah.
Those are the bulk of it kind of equally splay roughly. And then thereās all these different smaller pieces.
Hans Swildens:
But yeah. The, I would say that the fastest growing segment, which if you take the bar charts and you look at how itās gonna grow in the next five years, we think, the fastest growing segment is continuation funds
Turner Novak:
So this is essentially just, um... When you think about, when you talked about this, every other market has secondary purchases, and itās the bulk of it. So itās basically someone issues the primary, you buy the primary, and they just hold forever until thereās an IPO.
This is basically you issue it and you hold it d- to not quite forever. Someone starts to buy, and then they start to trade. Once itās traded, youāre selling it in a secondary.
Hans Swildens:
The IPO can be primary and secondary together, or it can be secondary only, but most of the time itās primary only. But it could be all that stuff. The, uh...
Once it lists, itās a secondary. The entire NASDAQ and, and, NYSE is secondaries.
Turner Novak:
Yeah, and itās interesting because you think of, as of today... I mean, maybe itāll go public after this gets published, but who, six months ago will say, SpaceX, right? Super popular company.
Everyone wants to own part of it but itās, itās difficult. Thereās a ton of friction. But just suddenly it IPOs, and you can, anyone in the world can buy and press a button, and thereās probably gonna be billions of shares or volume, probably hundreds of billions of volume traded per day in SpaceX.
And you think thatās just gonna start happening before the IPO. Thereās just gonna be more liquidity, more trading of the shares of, well-known assets. Theyāre already up.
And theyāll just get more prominent.
Hans Swildens:
But, yeah, every year it is.
Turner Novak:
Yes.
Hans Swildens:
I mean, Iāve had for 20 years, this is like, I know Iām like gave up. Itās like for 20 years Iāve had, when we go raise our capital or we go talk to people that donāt understand the market, theyāve said, āWell, this is gonna slow downā or, āThis is gonna go away,ā or, āThis is just a flash in the pan,ā or, āIf the regulatory restrictions get lifted on compliance, that everyoneās gonna list and then thereās no secondary market.ā And, and, when these big IPOs happen, thereās gonna be no secondary market. And itās like every year this thing keeps growing and growing and growing bec- as the number of companies that get funded grow, the amount of capital that goes into the primaries grow, and that keeps funding the derivative market, which is the secondary market.
And theyāre just,
Turner Novak:
Assets that people wanna own. Like, people want part of this good asset. Itās investments, yeah.
Just, itās simple investments.
Hans Swildens:
The thing that also is interesting about the secondary market i- for venture growth and private equity and stuff is you can have the same security held in different structures trading. So you can have, a company, a stock in the companyās trading in a secondary, and then you can have the fund interest that holds the stock trading itself as well, that holds the company thatās trading. So itās, itās multidimensional So like you can...
And then those two things might trade at different prices too, right? Because a buyer that wants to buy the stock directly might not wanna buy into a fund that has a fee and carry on it and has other assets, right? Most of the time they donāt want that, ācause they donāt want- they donāt know how to underwrite the other assets, they donāt want the other assets.
They just only buy one asset. But they have to take everything else, ācause itās a fund interest, right? They canāt, separate it out.
Although people are starting to try to separate things out now inside the fund stakes, but thatās a whole nother, a whole nother conversation. Okay. Thereās like a, thereās like a little bar chart, the little bar thatās starting thatās derivatives and futures.
And do you think thatāll get pretty big? I donāt know. I kinda donāt...
I would rather just buy the title to the securities and own the vanilla securities, either the fund interest or the, or the direct stock certificates or baskets of them So maybe weāre just old and, and, used to that. But like, in terms of derivatives and forward contracts and things, itās a small piece, but itās growing. You know, it could become big.
We also decided a long time ago not to do a lot of these option exercise loans, so we donāt do that. And there, that is a segment of the market, which is the employee stock option exercise loan market. And, we just, we just didnāt...
Because you have, you have to be a lender and thereās, thereās regulatory stuff around that, and we just wanted to be an equity investor. But yeah, so thereās a derivative market, thereās a loan market, thereās, thereās, a structured equity market, all in these different segments that people donāt see if youāre a primary investor.
Turner Novak:
So one of my friends, Zach Coelius, heās, he said that heās worked with you guys on some stuff in the past. He said youāre one of the most creative sec- like one of the most creative, like deal terms, deal maker investors heās ever worked with. So how do you typically approach a secondary transaction?
Like when you guys are coming in, like what are you specifically looking for? How do you think about making sure everyoneās happy? Because you could argue that someoneās getting a bad deal in any of these, in any transaction that happened, whether itās like the company, the LP, the GP youāre buying from, you guys are maybe getting a bad deal.
Like, how do you just think about structuring one of these things and approaching it?
Hans Swildens:
Yeah. I mean, I come at from like a solution provider perspective. Like, Iām, Iām, what do we need to do to help you, right?
If you are a seller of anything, why are you selling? What do you want to accomplish selling? And then how can we help you do that if we want to buy what you have?
So I think thatās the first thing is just approaching it like a partnership of like youāre a seller, weāre a buyer, weāre trying to solve your problem, weāre trying to put together a solution, and then we have to be competitive because thereās other buyers, right? And so I think one of the reasons why Zach might have said that is that weāve always looked at it as how can we solve this and when, right? I mean, because otherwise you never invest.
And so I think, weāre willing to do like special structures with people. Like if you say, āHey, Iām getting a divorce, and I want to keep my voting of the certificates, and Iām a founder, and I own twenty percent of a business thatās worth two billion dollars,ā so itās, itās, itās, itās, do the math, four hundred million bucks on paper, āand, and my husband or wife is getting half of that,ā so two hundred million bucks, ābut I want to keep the votes of that.ā Weād be like, āFine.ā You know what I mean? As long as it doesnāt impact our ability to exit at some point and get our cash back And we do the diligence around it that maybe weāre fine giving you the vote, right?
We just give you our proxy. And we could give you our proxy for a period of time, and then it revokes. So, a lot of people, wouldnāt think about doing that, right?
I mean, literally. Same thing with funds. Itās like, āOh, I want liquidity in my fund.
I havenāt had any DPI.ā Like, if you have a fund that has no DPI, but the one asset in the fund that is sellable that people will buy, I donāt wanna sell. But I w- so I wanna try to keep it right? But I still want money from it.
So what do you do? How do you do that? Thatās the point.
You have to sell it donāt you? So we can say, āHey, just go to your... We will sign a deal with you that you go to your investors with,ā ācause you have to get their approval because youāre gonna get compensated.
Youāre selling and youāre getting compensated, so you need approval from your investors. And we will lift out that investment from your portfolio and put it in a new partnership that sits next to your portfolio. Letās say itās called Banana Capital Fund 1, and Iāll create a Banana Capital Fund 1-A, and Iāll just move the certificate from the 1 to the 1-A.
Or youāre gonna ask the company to do that. And then youāve gotta ask your LPās, āHey, if you wanna get liquidity on this thing and get two times your money back, Iām willing to do that. These guys want me to manage it and theyāre gonna compensate me for doing that transaction.
Hereās what Iām doing. You know, itās fully disclosed. Here are m- how much money theyāre gonna pay me.
And youāre, youāre gonna have to approve this, and then weāre good. And you can... You know, the asset will be sold and moved into the fund.ā And you can say, ācause some of them might say, āI donāt like it,ā and you say, āWell, then great.
You can just roll your stake in there and have the same economics as you had before and youāre net neutral. So the people that wanna sell in your fund can sell. The people that donāt wanna sell donāt sell, and nothing happens to them.
Theyāre not forced into new economics or anything like that. Theyāre just net neutral. And then we could do, a deal with you and help you with that liquidity issue.ā Itās also, another oneās, youāre a corporate venture investor.
You ran out of money. Your CEO, your CEOās new and says that thereās a billion dollars of venture on your balance sheet. Youāre publicly traded, and thereās probably 500 million of unfunded to keep funding all the rounds so you donāt get wiped out.
And the corporate entity doesnāt wanna do that anymore. And we can go in there and say, āHey, weāll put up the 500 million to fund all your unfunded obligations, and weāll do that in a structure with you where you take your securities, put them in a fund, and weāll r- weāll negotiate terms and payments around how our capitalās being invested and called and when we get it back and at what rates and with what splits and what percentage of the partnership we own over time and what our return profiles are and stuff. And we will remove your unfunded 500 million on liability, and hereās an equity structure for that, and it looks like that.ā And so, because we because the market was...
I think we do this so well because when the market was so small, there was no transactions happening, and we had to, solve- You had to, make a transaction, yeah. Yes. But what happened is these transactions we were doing became segments, right?
And then became their own markets And thatās like the amazing entrepreneurial journey in this adventure, right? I mean, weāve been on this like 25-year adventure, and like the mountain keeps growing as we climb it. And so like we keep thinking weāre gonna hit the peak and then the thing grows another mile.
And itās been, an incredible journey, honestly.
Turner Novak:
And so thinking about like the mountainās gonna keep growing, right? Whether this is in 20 years or even- Yeah... Even in the next like 12 months weāll probably have...
I donāt know. I never know the timing of this stuff. Like SpaceX, OpenAI, Anthropic, it seems like theyāll all go public within the next 12 months.
Who knows when. Maybe thereāll be more. W- like, whatās kinda gonna happen over the next e- next year or so?
Are there things youāre kind of expecting or looking at, working on waiting for? Well, at
Hans Swildens:
A high level, the thing thatās the most concerning about the venture category to invest into is for the... Since 2001, so itās been five years, the distributions coming out of the industry have been 75% less than what they need to be to be healthy. This is each year itās below what it needs to be.
We need, we need about 20% of all the NAV in the market to exit each year to have a healthy market, because if you exit 20% of all your NAV in your fund every year, for five years youāll get your fund capital back, and then for the next five years you will get your returns back. Itās very simple. Thatās the math.
For the last four or five years, itās been five years now, been an average of like 5 to 7%. So you have a situation where most venture funds might have 20 cents back in the last five years. The whole industry hasnāt produced the, the distributions of cash thatās needed to have it function correctly.
So, whether or not these... So thereās gonna be have and have-nots in this thing, right? Like, whether or not these companies you mentioned go or not, I canāt comment because of where I work, but, not every vent- not all the venture funds are invested in these companies.
And if you have them in your funds, youāre probably gonna have, if they if they do what people think, distributions. And so youāre gonna see, I think it might create a bifurcated- M- more concentrated venture market because whatās happened... So the really interesting thing in the last, three years, and you can, this is a whole nother conversation, but itās super fascinating, is, I believe that the marketās barbellled.
So Itās either youāre very small and very... You have a very strong advantage doing a specific thing and youāre very differentiated, and you can still get the great deals at the early stages. You know, or youāre like a huge platform that youāre full stack all the way into the seed market and into the crossover market.
And so these larger platforms have just been pressuring everybody in the middle and everybody down into the seed market even. And if, if those are the people that own all the equity in these businesses, theyāre just gonna get bigger. And so whatās gonna happen is youāre gonna have more pressure to keep barbelling in the market, and everybody in the middle is gonna get blown away.
And so, yeah, I think that itās, itās, itās, itās, itās kinda
Turner Novak:
Fascinating. It is. It seems like those big ones that have sucked up a lot of the capital, theyāre also the ones giving capital back.
So, theyāre kind of, I donāt know, in a way, they have ball control over that flow of funds. Theyāre giving money back, so itās like, do you wanna put it somewhere else or do you wanna give it back to them? Like, whatās, whatās the call?
Hans Swildens:
Are you gonna... So as an LP, ācause, Iām an LP, who are you gonna prioritize? Someone that gave you all your money back or somebody who hasnāt given you anything back?
Yeah. Thatās fair. Itās pretty simple, right?
Like... Yeah. So, yeah, I think what the markets, the markets...
So one of the reasons why we decided to do the one plus one is three with the firm here, is we believe, and we got to a place where we thought this entire industry is gonna be very institutionalized. Kind of already is, but itās gonna be even more so. And then you have to be more at scale and have more proprietary information and more proprietary deal flow to compete over time.
So, we needed to decide if we were gonna get bigger and more competitive and, having more capabilities and to be in front of everybody. And we decided that it was a good time to
Turner Novak:
Do that. Do you... This is a little bit on that comment before.
So what would you do as a seed stage manager that is trying to continue to compete against the super, dominant platforms that are returning a ton of cash? Like, how do you, how do you think about putting a stake in the ground and, actually competing against them with a realistic strategy?
Hans Swildens:
Well, if you donāt have an answer for that, you should stop investing and go do something else, literally, ācause youāre just wasting your time and money, I think. āCause, or youāre just gonna have to be lucky And I donāt think lucky is a strategy, but maybe for some people it is. I think you-- I think that everybody needs to really work on how theyāre getting into the best companies at the early stage, and what it will take for them to take your check. Itās, I think the marketās changing in venture where itās getting more and more and more difficult to get in them, right? āCause thereās so many different people trying to put money in them that you have a hyper-competition, dynamic.
And in that case, the only way to win is to be super specialized, right? Carve out your own, carve out your own, your uni- your own unique deal flow mode. It could be with, proprietary AI technology.
Weāve seen that. Some of our managers have developed pretty incredible, sourcing and underwriting and transacting AI-driven, systems. So thatās, thatās one thing.
So there. And some of them, we have one that when we went through the whole thing, weāre like, āWow, thatās incredible.ā Like it is very awesome. And I think itās, itās focused on sourcing, right?
Sourcing and, and being first and the, and the best And doing that at scale so that even if they have hit like the thousand new companies that might be the next unicorns, that they actually can write a check into, 20% of them. āCause I think that the challenge now is not whether or not you can see them, itās actually whether or not you can get a check into them, right? When before, the seed funds would see them and be able to write a check ācause they were all like, there was a lot of hot tub thing where itās like, āOh, Iāll let Joe and, you know, Jennifer, everybodyās gonna come in, and hereās, 500 grand, 500 grand, 500 grand.ā It was a hot tub thing. Now itās like, āOh, this one manager wants to give me 50 million out of 250 pre and I donāt even have a deck.
Iāll take that.ā So then itās not syndicated anymore. Sorry. So then the seed funds donāt even...
They canāt even write a check, right? So I think that dynamic is new, and it creates challenges because if youāre a seed fund and youāre not getting into the best companies,
Turner Novak:
And you probably do have to be taking quite a bit of risk then, where youāre taking a risk on a founder that theyāre not gonna give 50 million to without a deck, or in a category. Maybe thatās, a new category thatās not, an instant check without even having a deck or a product yet.
Hans Swildens:
And those sometimes do work, right? Thatās the humbling thing about the market, is sometimes those people are the ones that create the biggest and best businesses, but itās not normal. Itās a hard thing to systematically, repeatedly do.
Turner Novak:
Yeah. And you also... Itās not like you do that and then in three months itās like, āOh, this works.
Hereās more money.ā Itās like you need to have a track record over a long period of time to prove that youāve done it like, once a year, a couple in each fund. So itās like takes 10 years to get there.
Hans Swildens:
One or two in banana one or two in banana two, one or two in banana three. You need to exit them. You need to return, three, four X net on your funds if they hold your s- hold those securities for longer than eight years to get your 20% compounded IRR or no oneās gonna give you
Turner Novak:
Any money. Is that probably the threshold, do you think, in venture, is the 20% IRR? You get above that?
Hans Swildens:
Yeah. You need 20% IRRs. High teens are okay, but, otherwise why are you doing venture?
Turner Novak:
Yeah. You can easily get 10% in the public markets.
Hans Swildens:
Yeah, you can just go buy, go buy distressed debt today at 15% returns. I mean, right? Senior secured loans.
Why would you do... Thatās more liquid and it pays, a monthly dividend. And you can lever it and make 25.
But thatās probably too jun- probably too junky. But, so yeah, I think venture needs to be high teens, low 20s. And compounded over 10 years, thatās a big multiple
Turner Novak:
Yeah, thatās fair. What, then what is your kind of rough ballpark then? Is that like a 5x, 10x over the years?
Like, what do you think you should shoot for?
Hans Swildens:
Well, hereās another one that is a learning thing. Weāre, weāre having, weāre... This is probably number 10 on the list of talking to you Sell seconders Do a continuation fund.
Do a secondary sale. Do a, move securities over to a side fund to buy out the LPās and the main fund from that security that wanna sell and get DPI. For the ones that donāt care about DPI, theyāll just roll.
Manufacture liquidity. Th- this is, this is something that people now, by the way, like the large platforms, have dedicated teams and their entire job is to manufacture liquidity. So if youāre a venture fund and youāre a seed fund and youāre not thinking about manufacturing liquidity, you also are a disadvantage to them there too because they will have more DPI and distributions than you ācause theyāre manufacturing liquidity.
Then you have another disadvantage against them. So yeah, you need to start manufacturing because when you look at... You have to look at cash flow, time, and IRR.
So like LPās donāt care if you give them a 5x multiple over 20 years. Theyāre better off buying muni bonds At no t- like literally, like itās, your IRR is like six, right? Iām better off buying California muni bonds that are tax-free.
I will make more money buying an automated muni ladder than putting money with you, and I get monthly income thatās tax-free. So, like the multiple is one metric, the IRR is the other, and you need to look at both. Because if youāre not compounding capital at 18% plus, no oneās gonna give you money.
I mean, maybe if 12 theyāve... Maybe theyāll take a shot thinking maybe the next oneās 18 or something. But like if you consistently have produced 9%, 10%, 12% net IRR funds, that is not interesting.
How do
Turner Novak:
You look at, like a ā19 through ā21 vintage, like as a pool? Like, what are you seeing as being interesting in terms of like the IRR on that pool? Because it was like a, it was a, it was a rough vintage.
Hans Swildens:
The funds that weāre in that have manufactured liquidity are doing 10 times better than the ones that didnāt. But weāre in a fund thatās a growth fund, okay? Which youād think got destroyed, ācause most of them did.
And itās like two and a half X net. Thatās a 2021 vintage. And itās, itās almost fully real- itās almost fully realized, ācause they did a whole continuation fund out of it.
Well, the DP- itās already got 200% plus DPI And theyāre out of the securities. Theyāre sitting in the continuation fund
Turner Novak:
If you- unless you roll. So this is probably, 50 to 100% IRR, Iām assuming, based on when they did it.
Hans Swildens:
When I look at that manager, yeah, the IRR is awesome, the DPI is incredible, the multipleās good. Iām gonna reload, ācause that manager managed my money in an amazing way, but it wasnāt through natural exits. It wasnāt through an M&A exit or an IPO exit.
It was through secondaries.
Turner Novak:
And this is, this is, a pretty new thing in venture, and we probably, romanticize the IPO and romanticize, this incredible founder relationship for decades upon decades. But in private equity, in se- like, I feel like it... The way I think about it is, as a seed stage manager, Iām, a lower bottom middle market private equity firm.
And the way private equity works, itās like you sell to a firm that sits slightly above you in the stack, and then you sell to a firm that sits slightly above, and you might do that, four times. And then itās, a public company. Itās a- but...
And thatās, super common. Like, thereās, five secondary transactions of the asset. Itās, 60, 70% of how people exit in that market.
Yeah. So y- and so you think over the next decade, this is just going to become... Like, as a, as a...
Maybe even today, as a venture manager, you gotta think about this. I donāt think venture funds have a
Hans Swildens:
Choice anymore. I think they used to have one, until for five years thereās 5 to 7% DPI coming out of the funds. If youāre in year, 10, and the, your fund has, 20% DPI, nobodyās gonna give you any money.
Turner Novak:
You would probably just need, an absolutely incredible asset in there to justify him not selling it. But you probably shouldāve been trimming some over time anyways to give you some DPI back.
Hans Swildens:
Thatās death to a firm. If you... Like, we have, we have this one firm which I canāt even talk to anymore because itās like, and, itās like the fund was awesome.
Okay? It was at, a 30% net IRR. It was at a 4x.
It was, four years in. I mean, it was cranking. And- They had a bunch of SPACs in the fund, three of them, and they could have sold them all.
And then all the SPACs melted, okay? And the fundās at a.8 with no DPI. And they could have realized, a 4x.
It could be 400% DPI. And the only reason why they they didnāt, they they just decided to hold. Sorry.
Go ahead. Iām sorry. And itās just, itās just frustrating, as an LP because, I would talk to them and be like, āJust sell your fund cost out.
Just, take 25% of your securities and sell them. Keep the other 75, just give us our money back. Youāre at a 4x, thatās great.
Youāre at a amazing gross and net return. Like, youāre a home run. Like, you just won.
You won the lottery.ā Like, you know what I... And the carried interest in that thing, it was, 200 million. So if you do the math, it was like 8, 700 million of profits.
It was $140 million of the GP thatās now zero.
Turner Novak:
Thatās insane. Thatās, thatās really unfortunate. Yeah.
H- how do you think AI is kind of changing this stuff? Like, is there any developments around the capabilities of LLMs thatās gonna impact the secondary markets, and maybe venture as a whole, and maybe... Like, what are you seeing already?
Hans Swildens:
All this stuffās gonna impact you and me, for sure. It already has, I think. I think to under- W- weāve been implementing, we have this GSAI internally we use, and then thereās also Copilot and some other technologies, and thereās a whole muc- bunch of new stuff coming down the pike that is making underwriting easier Better.
And we also are, I think sourcing is also gonna become much more improved. I think the entire process of sourcing, selecting, underwriting, transacting, exiting, even with the different secondary categories and segments we talked about, some of it could be more autom- Like if you just dropped your fund, uh, documents into, if I had an LLM that was my own, and you just like uploaded your, audits and your LP reports for the last five years, and all your one-pagers and all your financials and all your companies, everything like that, and I just like would spit out a price Or maybe that would help you value the portfolio. I could actually have a, I could have a statistical analysis of all that data
Turner Novak:
Oh, thatād be helpful, yeah...
Hans Swildens:
Where you, where you are in your capital calls and distributions and your IRR multiples, and at what points in time do you need to sell certain things or restructure things to get you and manufacture a 18% net IRR on a low case so that you, constantly are doing distributions and, and having a minimal return to meet the threshold of what your investors want. So you can manufacture it out if you have good assets. If you obviously have bad assets, no oneās gonna buy anything.
But if you have, good companies that are compounding that you could kind of use it to, continue to optimize that multiple VPI IRR matrix Thatād be a
Turner Novak:
Very easy thing to do. Well, itās, itās just like a lot of work with all that, but maybe if itās like a new relationship, you can just be like, to your point, āGive us all your stuff. Weāll ingest it all,ā and the LLM will be like, āYou know, this is directionally pretty interesting. Letās spend some time.ā
Well, thanks for coming on the show. This was a lot of fun.
Hans Swildens:
Yeah. It was great to see you, and thanks for having me.
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